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Abstract
The co-movements of labor productivity with output, total hours, vacancies and unemployment 
have changed since the mid 1980s. This paper offers an explanation for the sharp break 
in the fl uctuations of labor market variables based on endogenous labor supply decisions 
following the mortgage market deregulation. Our exercise shows that the dynamic pattern of 
the labor market variables might have been substantially affected by the increase in household 
leverage in the US in the last twenty years. We set up a search model with effi cient bargaining 
and fi nancial frictions, in which impatient borrowers can take an amount of credit that cannot 
exceed a proportion of the expected value of their real estate holdings. When borrowers’ 
equity requirements are low, the impact of a positive technology shock on the marginal utility 
of consumption is strengthened, which in turn results in lower hours per worker and higher 
wages in the bargaining process. This shift in labor supply discourages fi rms from opening 
vacancies, reducing the impact of the shock on employment. 
Keywords: business cycle, labor market, borrowing restrictions.
JEL classifi cation: E24, E32, E44.
Resumen
Las correlaciones de la productividad del trabajo con el output, el total de horas trabajadas, 
las vacantes y el desempleo han cambiado desde 1980 en Estados Unidos. En este trabajo 
se propone una explicación para estos y otros cambios en las fl uctuaciones de las variables 
laborales basado en el comportamiento de la oferta de trabajo tras la desregulación del 
mercado hipotecario que ha llevado a un fuerte incremento del endeudamiento de las 
familias durante los últimos veinte años. Utilizamos para ello un modelo de búsqueda con 
negociación efi ciente en el que los consumidores impacientes pueden endeudarse hasta un 
máximo que viene dado por una fracción del valor esperado de su propiedad inmobiliaria. 
Conforme aumenta la capacidad de endeudamiento de los hogares también lo hace el 
impacto de los shocks tecnológicos sobre la utilidad marginal del consumo, lo que redunda 
en la reducción de las horas por trabajador y en un aumento del salario negociado. Esto a 
su vez reduce el incentivo de las empresas a abrir nuevas vacantes mitigando el impacto 
positivo de dicho shock sobre el empleo.
Palabras claves: ciclo económico, mercado laboral, restricciones crediticias.
Códigos JEL: E24, E32, E44.
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1. Introduction
Recent research has revealed significant changes in the co-movements and volatility of
most labor market variables since the early eighties. In particular, Galí and Gambetti (2009)
and Galí and van Rens (2010) highlight the following facts:
 The correlation of labor productivity with both output and labor input has experienced
a sharp decline.
 The volatility of hours, in relative terms, has risen.
 The volatility of real wages, relative to that of output, has increased.
Additionally, Barnichon (2009) emphasizes the following correlations:
 The correlation between labor productivity and unemployment has increased from
negative to positive.
 The correlation between labor productivity and vacancies has shifted from positive to
zero.
This empirical evidence poses a challenge for macroeconomic models that rely on
structural stability to produce testable implications and policy recommendations. Do these
variations stem from variations in the data generating process of exogenous shocks, or are
they rather the consequence of the many changes that have taken place in most markets
during the postwar era? Galí and van Rens (2010) provide an explanation of most of these
changes on the basis of increased labor market flexibility in the US, that they parameterize
as a reduction of hiring costs in a model with two labor inputs: hours and effort 1.
In this paper we turn our attention to another well documented structural change
that has taken place over the last twenty years: the process of financial deepening favored
1 Because of the features of their model, they cannot address issues regarding unemployment and vacancies.
by the worldwide reduction in interest rates and the numerous reforms in regulations.
The effects of financial conditions on the real economy has attracted increasing attention
since the works of Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Here, we
focus on the reorganization of the housing finance system that took place in the early 1980s
as a consequence of the Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the Garn-St. Germain Act of
1982. This change brought about a substantial reduction in the required home equity for
indebted households, which was followed by a borrowing boom.
The importance of the financial liberalization in the mortgage market has also been
studied by Iacoviello and Neri (2010) to explain the strengthening of the link between the
fluctuations in house prices and consumption. In a similar vein, the papers by Campbell
and Hercowitz (2005, 2009) relate the Great Moderation to the aforementioned changes
in the financial sector2. To explain the reduction in the volatility of output, these authors
argue that productivity shocks generate smaller labor supply responses by collateral con-
strained households in the presence of lower equity requirements. In fact, this mechanism
is also present in our paper, although we will subject it to further scrutiny, since we are
interested in a broader number of facts involving other labor market variables. For this
reason we will need to depart from the Walrasian labor market model, asumed by these
authors.
2 Smith (2009) shows that the conclusions reached by Campbell and Hercowitz are robust to changes in the
exact details of how housing, housing debt and mortgage financing are modeled.
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matching framework, we are able to explore the connections of household indebtedness
with variables such as unemployment and vacancies that are not present in frictionless
labor markets.
The main result of the paper is that increasing household borrowing is sufficient to
explain the observed changing pattern of second moments described above. This happens
regardless of whether leverage is increased through changes in the intensive or extensive
borrowing margin, although a high loan-to-value is required to match the evidence rel-
ative to some other moments. We also show that the explanation provided by Galí and
van Rens (2010) for the vanishing procyclicality of labor productivity withstands the more
complex structure of our model. In our set-up, enhanced labor market flexibility, in the
form of diminishing costs of vacancy posting, also helps to explain other empirical fea-
tures such as the increasing correlation between productivity and unemployment.
Although both types of institutional changes, in labor and financial markets, give
rise to qualitatively similar results in terms of labor market statistics, the transmission
mechanism is different. Raising labor market frictions affects employment, productivity
and wages through the demand side of the labor market. Changes in labor market flexi-
bility have a direct bearing on the extensive margin, making adjustments in the intensive
margin less compelling. In our model, less onerous vacancy posting intensifies the (posi-
tive) response of the number of job openings to a positive technological innovation. This
results in a stronger increase in employment, as well as in wages and output. The sharper
increase in wages mutes the response of hours per person (intensive margin), so total labor
input, and hence output, react less than employment, thus increasing the relative volatility
of the latter. The intuition for the other results goes along the same lines.
When it comes to financial deepening, it is the interplay between consumption and
labor supply decisions that shapes the response of total labor input. In a nutshell, the
reduction in equity requirements eases borrowing constraints and facilitates access to con-
We develop a tractable search and matching model with efficient bargaining for
wages and hours 3 with two types of households: patient and impatient. Due to the pres-
ence of underlying friction in the credit market, more impatient consumers are restricted
in the amount they can borrow by the expected real value of their real estate. We follow
a methodological strategy akin to that of Galí and van Rens (2010) and investigate how
changes in some key parameters, such as the loan-to-value ratio and the proportion of
borrowers in the economy, help make model predictions consistent with all the facts de-
scribed above. We see our results as complementary to those of Galí and van Rens (2010),
since the most likely explanation of these facts would involve a combination of both mech-
anisms: increased labor market flexibility and financial deepening.
Our paper departs from previous research in different aspects. First, with respect to
our focus, we aim to connect all the facts listed above to the changing volume of household
indebtedness in the economy. As far as we are aware, this link has not been previously
established in the literature. Second, while we allow for changes in the intensive margin of
borrowing (loan-to-value), we also consider the extensive margin, defined as the number
of borrowers over the total population. Third, by building our model on a search and
3 Dromel et al (2009) use an equilibrium matching model with exogenous wage and credit market imperfec-
tions to study the persitence of unemployment, but their modeling strategy is otherwise quite different to ours.
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sumption by impatient households after a technology shock. This drags down the mar-
ginal utility of consumption, which affects the bargaining process as a negative labor sup-
ply effect, reinforcing the fall in hours per worker and the upward pressure on wages.
These less favorable outcomes of bargaining reduce the surplus of successful matches,
thereby discouraging vacancy posting and augmenting the (negative) impact of the shock
on employment. The larger the loan-to-value ratio, the more negative the response of total
hours is, thus increasing its volatility relative to output and reducing its correlation with
labor productivity.
Additionally, as borrowers face less borrowing restrictions, lenders find it optimal
to increase the amount of loans by deviating resources away from consumption and in-
vestment. As a consequence, productive investment reacts less to the technology shock
and capital becomes less volatile, contributing to a substantial reduction in the standard
deviation of output for a sufficiently large number of borrowers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical
model. Section 3 contains the empirical facts as well as the calibration of the model. Sec-
tion 4 presents the simulation exercises. Finally, section 5 offers the main conclusions.
2. Theoretical framework
We model a decentralized closed economy in which households and firms trade one fi-
nal good and two production factors: productive capital and labor. While capital is ex-
changed in a perfectly competitive market, the labor market is non-Walrasian. Besides la-
bor and capital, households own all the firms operating in the economy. Households rent
capital and labor services to firms and receive income in the form of interest and wages.
Firms post new vacancies every period, paying a fixed cost while the vacancy remains un-
filled. The fact that trade in the labor market is resource and time-consuming generates
a monopoly rent associated with each job match. It is assumed that workers and firms
bargain over these monopoly rents in Nash fashion.
Each household is made up of working-age agents who may be either employed or
unemployed. If unemployed, agents are actively searching for a job. Firms’ investment in
vacant posts is endogenously determined and so are job inflows. Finally, job destruction
is considered exogenous.
As in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Iacoviello (2005), there are two types of rep-
resentative households, Nlt of them are patient and N
b
t are impatient. All have access to
the financial market and patient households are the owners of physical capital. Patient
households are characterized by having a lower discount rate than impatient ones. This
ensures that in the steady-state, and under fairly general conditions, patient households
are net lenders while impatient households become net borrowers. Due to some underly-
ing friction in the financial market, borrowers face a binding constraint in the amount of
credit they can take that is given by the expected real value of their real estate holdings.
Houses are assumed to be the only collateralizable asset. The size of the working-age pop-
ulation is given by Nt  Nlt  Nbt . Let 1 τb and τb denote the proportions of lenders
and borrowers households in the working-age population; these shares are assumed to be
constant over time, unless otherwise stated. For simplicity, we assume no growth in the
working-age population.
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Both types of households maximize intertemporal utility by selecting streams of
consumption, leisure and housing services. Household members may be either employed
or unemployed, but are able to fully insure each other against fluctuations in employment,
as in Andolfatto (1996) or Merz (1995).
2.1 Patient households
Patient households discount the future less heavily than impatient ones. They face the
following maximization program:
max
clt ,k
l
t ,j
l
t ,b
l
t ,x
l
t
Et
∞
∑
t0
βlt

 ln

clt  hlclt1

 φx ln

xlt

 nlt1φ1
1l1t1η
1η
1 nlt1φ2
1l21η
1η

 (1)
subject to,
clt jlt

1 φ
2

jlt
klt1

 qt

xlt  xlt1

 blt  nlt1wtl1t rt1klt1 1 rnt1
blt1
πt
 ζ lt
(2)
klt  jlt  1 δklt1 (3)
nlt  1 σnlt1  ρwt 1 nlt1 (4)
Lower case variables in the maximization problem above are normalized by the working-
age population (Nt). Variables and parameters indexed by b and l respectively denote im-
patient and patient households. Non-indexed variables apply indistinctly to both types of
households. Thus, clt, x
l
t,n
l
t1 and 1nlt1 represent, consumption, housing holdings, the
employment rate and the unemployment rate of patient households. There is risk-sharing
at household level, so that consumption is the same regardless of employment status. The
time endowment is normalized to one; l1t and l2 are hours worked per employee and
hours devoted to job seeking by the unemployed. Note that while the household decides
over l1t, the time devoted to job searching (l2) is assumed to be exogenous.
Regarding the parameters in the utility function of Ricardian households, βl  0, 1
is the time discount rate, whereas 1η measures the negative of the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply. As consumption is subject to habits, the parameter hl takes a positive value, φx is
the housing weight in life-time utility. In general φ1 	 φ2, i.e., the subjective value of
leisure imputed by workers may vary with their employment status4.
The flow of funds constraint (2) describes the various sources and uses of income.
The term wtnlt1l1t captures net labor income earned by the fraction of employed workers,
where wt stands for hourly real wages. There are three assets in the economy. First, private
productive capital (klt), which is owned solely by patient households who get a total return
4 Note, that there are two differences in the utility function with respect to a standard search model as in
Andolfatto (1996); the presence of habits in consumption and the presence of housing services.
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of rt1klt1, where rt represents the gross return on physical capital. Second, there are
loans/debt in the economy. Thus, patient households lend in real termsblt (or borrow blt)
and receive back 1 rnt1blt1, where rnt1 is the nominal interest rate on loans between
t 1 and t. Notice that in the budget constraint (2), the gross inflation rate between t 1
and t (πt in the term 1 rnt1
blt1
πt
reflects the assumption that debt contracts are set in
nominal terms. Third, impatient households own a given amount of houses xlt out of a
total fixed stock of real estate in the economy; the term qt

xlt  xlt1

denotes housing
investment by patient households, where qt is the real housing price.
Consumption and investment are respectively given by clt and j
l
t

1 φ2

jlt
kt1

,
which includes investment installation costs. There are also adjustment costs stemming
from changing the housing stock that we model as:
ζ lt  φh

xlt  xlt1

/xlt1
2
qtxlt1/2
The remaining constraints faced by patient households concern the laws of motion for
capital and employment. Each period the capital stock klt1 depreciates at the exogenous
rate δ and is accumulated through investment, jlt. Thus, it evolves according to (3). Em-
ployment obeys the law of motion (4), where nlt1 and 1 nlt1 respectively denote the
fraction of employed and unemployed patient workers in the economy at the beginning
of period t. Each period, jobs are lost at the exogenous rate σ. Likewise, new employment
opportunities come at the rate ρwt , which represents the probability that one unemployed
worker will find a job. Although the job-finding rate ρwt is considered exogenous by in-
dividual workers, at the aggregate level it is endogenously determined according to the
following Cobb-Douglas matching function5:
ρwt 1 nt1  χ1v
χ2
t 1 nt1 l2
1χ2 (5)
where vt stands for the number of active vacancies during period t.
Given the recursive structure of the above problem, it may be equivalently rewritten
in terms of a dynamic program. Thus, the value function WΩlt satisfies the following
Bellman equation:
WΩlt  max
clt ,k
l
t ,j
l
t ,b
l
t ,x
l
t



ln

clt  hlclt1

 φx ln

xlt

 nlt1φ1
1l1t1η
1η
1 nlt1φ2
1l21η
1η  β
lEtWΩlt1


 (6)
5 This specification presumes that all workers are identical to the firm.
where maximization is subject to constraints (2), (3) and (4). The solution to the optimiza-
tion program above generates the following first-order conditions for consumption, capital
stock, investment, loans and housing demand:
λl1t 

1
clt  hlclt1
 βl h
l
clt1  hlclt

(7)
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λl2t
λl1t
 βlEt
λl1t1
λl1t

rt 
φ
2
jl2t1
kl2t
 λ
l
2t1
λl1t1
1 δ

(8)
λl2t  λl1t

1 φ

jlt
klt1

(9)
1  βlEt
λl1t1
λl1t

rnt  1
πt1

(10)
λl1tqt

1 φh

xlt
xlt1
 1

 φx
xlt
βlEtqt1λl1t1

1 1
2
φh

xlt1
xlt
 1

xlt1
xlt
 1

(11)
According to condition (7) the current marginal utility of consumption depends on both
past and expected future consumption due to the presence of habits. Expression (8) en-
sures that the intertemporal reallocation of capital cannot improve the household’s utility.
Equation (9) states that investment is undertaken to the extent that the opportunity cost
of a marginal increase in investment in terms of consumption is equal to its marginal ex-
pected contribution to the household’s utility. First-order condition (10) means that varia-
tions across periods in the marginal utility of consumption are coherent with the discount
rate and existing real interest rates. Finally, expression (11) determines the optimal path of
housing purchases or housing demand.
Now it is convenient to derive the marginal value of employment for a worker
( ∂W
l
t
∂nlt1
 λlht) which will play an important role in the bargaining process discussed be-
low. This is given by,
λlht  λl1twtl1t 

φ1
1 l1t1η
1 η  φ2
1 l21η
1 η

 1 σ ρwt βlEt
∂Wlt1
∂nt
(12)
where λlht measures the marginal contribution of a newly created job to the household’s
utility. The first term on the right hand side captures the value of the cash-flow generated
by the new job in t, i.e. the labor income measured according to its utility value in terms
of consumption (λl1t). The second term represents the net utility arising from the newly
created job. Finally, the third term represents the "capital value" of an additional employed
worker, given that this employment status will persist in the future, conditional to the
probability that the new job will not be lost.
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2.2 Impatient households
Impatient households discount the future more heavily than patient ones so their discount
rate satisfies βb  βl . Since these households do not hold physical capital, they face the
following maximization program,
max
cbt ,b
b
t ,x
b
t
Et
∞
∑
t0
βbt

 ln

cbt  hbcbt1

 φx ln

xbt

 nbt1φ1
1l1t1η
1η
1 nbt1φ2
1l21η
1η

 (13)
subject to the flow of funds constraint, a borrowing constraint and the law of motion of
employment, as reflected in
cbt  qt

xbt  xbt1

 bbt  nbt1wtl1t  1 rnt1bbt1/πt  ζbt (14)
bbt  mbEt

qt1πt1xbt
1 rnt

(15)
nbt  1 σnbt1  ρwt 1 nbt1 (16)
where ζbt  φh

xbt  xbt1

/xbt1
2
qtxbt1/2 denotes the housing adjustment cost. The
parameter φx that accounts for the weight of housing in preferences is the same as for
patient households. Notice that restrictions (14) and (16) are analogous to those for patient
individuals (with the exception that impatient households do not accumulate physical
capital). mb in (15) is the loan-to-value ratio that determines the degree of pledgeability
of housing holdings. As shown in Iacoviello (2005), without uncertainty the assumption
βb  βl guarantees that (15) holds with equality.
In the case of impatient households, the value function WΩbt  satisfies the follow-
ing Bellman equation:
WΩbt   max
cbt ,b
b
t ,x
b
t



ln

cbt  hbcbt1

 φx ln

xbt

 nbt1φ1
1l1t1η
1η
1 nbt1φ2
1l21η
1η  β
bEtWΩbt1


 (17)
The solution to the optimization program, subject to (14), (15) and (16), is characterized by
the following first-order conditions:
λb1t 

1
cbt  hbcbt1
 βb h
b
cbt1  hbcbt

(18)
λb1t  βbEtλb1t1

1 rnt
πt1

 μbt 1 rnt  (19)
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λb1tqt

1 φh

xbt
xbt1
 1

 φx
xbt
 μbt mbqt1πt1
βbEtqt1λb1t1

1 1
2
φh

xbt1
xbt
 1

xbt1
xbt
 1

(20)
where μbt is the Lagrange multiplier of the borrowing constraint, and the marginal value
of employment for an impatient household worker ( ∂W
b
t
∂nbt1
 λbht) is,
λbht  λb1twtl1t 

φ1
1 l1t1η
1 η  φ2
1 l21η
1 η

 1 σ ρwt βbEt
∂Wbt1
∂nt
(21)
which can be interpreted in the same way as that of patient households.
2.3 Aggregation
Aggregate consumption and employment are weighted averages of the corresponding
variables for each household type,
ct 

1 τb

clt  τbcbt (22)
nt 

1 τb

nlt  τbnbt (23)
τbbbt  1 τbblt  0 (24)
τbxbt  1 τbxlt  X (25)
where τb represents the share of impatient households in the economy and X is the fixed
stock of real estate in the economy. Aggregate capital and investment can be obtained as:
kt 

1 τb

klt (26)
jt 

1 τb

jlt (27)
In addition, as we will explain below, we consider an aggregator (trade union) that
pools the surpluses from employment, in terms of consumption, of both types of house-
holds and uses this aggregate in the negotiation of hours and wages:
λht 

1 τb
 λlht
λl1t
 τb λ
b
ht
λb1t
(28)
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2.4 Factor demands
Factor demands are obtained by solving the profit maximization problem faced by each
competitive producer:
max
kt ,vt
Et
∞
∑
t0
βlt λ
l
1t1
λl1t
yt  rt1kt1  wtnt1l1t  κvvt (29)
subject to
yt  ztk1αt1 nt1l1t
α (30)
nt  1 σnt1  ρ
f
t vt (31)
where, in accordance with the ownership structure of the economy, future profits are
discounted at the patient household’s relevant rate

βlt λ
l
1t1
λl1t

. Producers use two in-
puts, capital and labor and all workers are perfect substitutes in production irrespective
of their financial position.6 Technological possibilities are given by a standard Cobb-
Douglas constant-returns-to-scale production function, where zt stands for a technology
shock ln zt  1 ρz ln A  ρz ln zt1  εt, A represents the long-run level of total fac-
tor productivity and εt  N0, σz. ρ ft is the probability that a vacancy will be filled in
any given period t. The probability of filling a vacancy, ρ ft , is exogenous from the firm’s
perspective; however, the aggregate rate is endogenously determined by the following
condition
ρwt 1 nt1  ρ
f
t vt  χ1v
χ2
t 1 nt1 l2
1χ2 (32)
which involves the Cobb-Douglas matching function
We can express the maximum expected value of the firm at tΩ ft as a function VΩ
f
t 
that satisfies the following Bellman equation:
VΩ ft   maxkt ,vt

yt  rt1kt1  wtnt1l1t  κvvt  βlEt
λl1t1
λl1t
VΩ ft1

(33)
The solution to the optimization program above generates the following first-order condi-
tions for private capital and the number of vacancies
rt  1 α
yt1
kt
(34)
κv
ρ
f
t
 βlEt
λl1t1
λl1t
∂Vt1
∂nt
(35)
6 Iacoviello and Neri (2010) assume complementarity across the labor skills of the two groups. As the authors
recognize ’the formulation in which hours are substitutes is perhaps more natural, but analytically less tractable:
while it implies equal wages across agents, it also implies that hours worked by one group will affect total wage
income received by the other group, thus creating a complex interplay between borrowing constraints and labor
supply decisions of both groups’ [sic]
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where the demand for capital is determined by (34) and is positively related to the mar-
ginal productivity of capital 1 α yt1kt , which in equilibrium must be equal to the gross
return on productive capital. Expression (35) reflects that firms choose the number of
vacancies in such a way that the marginal posting cost per vacancy, κv, is equal to the
expected present value of holding it, βlEt
λl1t1
λl1t
ρ
f
t
∂Vt1
∂nt1
.
Using the Bellman equation the marginal value of an additional employment in t
for a firm (λ f t  ∂Vt∂nt1 ) is,
λ f t  α
yt
nt1
 wtl1t  1 σβlEt
λl1t1
λl1t
∂Vt1
∂nt
(36)
where the marginal contribution of a new job to profits equals the marginal product net of
the wage rate, plus the capital value of the new job in t, adjusted by the probability that the
job will continue in the future. Now using (36) one period ahead, we can rewrite condition
(35) as:
κv
ρ
f
t
 βlEt

λl1t1
λl1t

α
yt1
nt
 wt1l1t1  1 σ
κv
ρ
f
t1

(37)
2.5 Trade in the labor market: the labor contract
The key departure of search models from the competitive paradigm is that trade in the
labor market is subject to transaction costs. Each period, unemployed workers engage in
search activities in order to find a job. The existence of costly searches in the labor market
implies that there are simultaneous flows into and out of the state of employment, so an
increase (reduction) in the stock of unemployment results from the predominance of job
losses (creation) over job creation (losses). Stable unemployment occurs whenever inflows
and outflows cancel out one another, i.e.,
ρ
f
t vt  ρwt 1 nt1  χ1v
χ2
t 1 nt1 l2
1χ2  σnt1 (38)
Because it takes time (for households) and real resources (for firms) to make profitable
contacts, some pure economic rent emerges with each new job, which is equal to the sum
of the expected transaction (search) costs the firm and the worker will further incur if they
refuse to match. The emergence of such rent gives rise to a bilateral monopoly framework.
Once a representative job-seeking worker and vacancy-offering firm match, they
negotiate a labor contract in hours and wages. Although patient and impatient house-
holds have a different reservation wage, they delegate the bargain process with firms to
a trade union. This trade union maximizes the aggregate marginal value of employment
for workers (28) and distributes employment according to their shares in the working-age
population. The implication of this assumption is that all workers receive the same wage,
work the same number of hours and have the same unemployment rates. Thus, follow-
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ing standard practice, the Nash bargain process maximizes the weighted product of the
parties’ surpluses from employment.
max
wt,l1t

1 τb
 λlht
λl1t
 τb λ
b
ht
λb1t
ψw 
λ f t
1ψw
 max
wt,l1t
λhtψ
w 
λ f t
1ψw
(39)
where ψw  0, 1 reflects the workers’ bargaining power. The first term in brackets rep-
resents the worker surplus (as a weighted average of borrower and lender worker sur-
pluses), while the second is the firm surplus. More specifically, λlht/λ
l
1t and λ
b
ht/λ
b
1t re-
spectively denote the premium (in terms of consumption) of employment over unemploy-
ment for a patient and an impatient worker. Notice that both premia are weighted in (39)
according to the share of borrowers in the population (τb). The solution of the Nash max-
imization problem gives the optimal real wage and hours worked7:
wtl1t  ψw

α
yt
nt1
 κvvt1 nt1

(40)
1 ψw

1 τb
λl1t
 τ
b
λb1t

φ2
1 l21η
1 η  φ1
1 l1t1η
1 η

1 ψw1 σ ρwt τbEt
λbht1
λb1t1

βl
λl1t1
λl1t
 βb λ
b
1t1
λb1t

α
yt
nt1l1,t


1 τb
λl1t
 τ
b
λb1t

φ11 l1tη (41)
Putting the last term on the right hand side aside, the wage prevailing in the search
equilibrium is a weighted average of the highest feasible wage (i.e., the marginal produc-
tivity of labor plus hiring costs per unemployed worker) and the outside option (i.e., the
reservation wage as given by the difference between the utility of leisure of an unemployed
person and an employed worker). This reservation wage is, in turn, a weighted average
of the lowest acceptable wage of both types of workers. The third term on the right hand
side of (40) is part of the reservation wage and can be interpreted as an inequality term in
utility. The economic intuition is as follows: impatient consumers are constrained by their
collateral requirements, so that they are not allowed to use their entire wealth to smooth
consumption over time. However, they can take advantage of the fact that a match today
continues with some probability 1 σ in the future, yielding a labor income that in turn
will be used to consume tomorrow. Therefore, they use the margin that hour and wage
7 Boscá, Doménech and Ferri (2011) derive similar equations in a search model with Ricardian and rule-of-thumb
consumers.
negotiations provide them to improve their lifetime utility by narrowing the gap in utility
with respect to patient consumers.
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2.6 Interest rate rule and the accounting identity
We assume the existence of a central bank in our economy that follows a Taylor’s interest
rate rule,
1 rnt 

1 rnt1
rR

πt11rπ

yt1
y
ry
rr
1rR
(42)
where y and rr are steady-state levels of output and the real interest rate, respectively.
The parameter rR captures the extent of interest rate inertia, and rπ and ry represent the
weights given by the central bank to inflation and output objectives.
Finally, to close the model, output is defined as the sum of demand components:
yt  ct  jt

1 φ
2

jt
kt1

 κvvt (43)
3. Evidence and calibration
3.1 Stylized facts
Although the US cyclical features we document here are already known8, we summarize
our own empirical estimates for the relevant second moments in Table 1. Data come from
different sources (see Table A1 in the Appendix). All series have been HP filtered (with
a smoothing parameter of 1600) to obtain their trend and cyclical components. In addi-
tion to the complete period 1964:1-2008:39, we split the sample in two, taking the year
1982 as a breaking point, in order to capture the important reorganization of the housing
finance system that was brought about by the Monetary Control Act of 1980 (President
Carter) and the Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982 (President Reagan). This new system, along
with the progressive deepening in the financial market, triggered a substantial increase in
indebtedness that is the key ingredient of the simulations below and one possible expla-
nation for the changes observed in Table 1. We can list these empirical facts, comparing
the pre and post 1982 samples as follows:
8 Galí and Gambetti (2009) and Barnichon (2009) document the changing pattern across time of relative volatil-
ities and correlations of labor market variables. Many other authors, for example Cheron and Langot (2004),
Shimer (2005) or Ravn and Simonelli (2008), have also documented labor market data moments without distin-
guishing across subsamples.
9 Data for vacancies end in 2006:3.
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Table 1  Empirical Facts
Periods
Moments 64-08 64-82 83-08
σy 1.55 1.93 1.19
(0.16) (0.24) (0.12)
σl1tnt/σy 1.12 1.04 1.26
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
σwt/σy 0.61 0.42 0.88
(0.20) (0.27) (0.15)
corr ytl1tnt , yt 0.43 0.67 -0.03
(0.13) (0.13) (0.09)
corr ytl1tnt , l1tnt 0.00 0.30 -0.48
(0.14) (0.16) (0.14)
corr ytl1tnt , ut -0.06 -0.33 0.44
(0.11) (0.15) (0.13)
corr ytl1tnt , vt 0.22 0.46 -0.23
(0.13) (0.14) (0.14)
Note: in parenthesis standard errors calculated
with the optimal bandwidth procedure from
Newey and West (1994).
1. The volatility of hours, relative to that of output, has risen.
2. The volatility of real wages, relative to that of output, has increased.
3. The positive correlation of labor productivity with output has vanished.
4. The correlation of labor productivity with labor input (total hours) has experienced a
sharp decline, changing from positive to negative.
5. The correlation between labor productivity and unemployment has increased from
negative to positive.
6. The correlation between labor productivity and vacancies has shifted from positive to
non significantly distinct to zero.
Figures 1 and 2 offer an illustration of these facts by confronting the evolution of the
cyclical component of the variables implied over time.
3.2 Model parameterization
The calibration strategy follows three steps. First, some model parameters have been set
to some consensus values drawn from related papers in the literature. Second, some other
parameters have been obtained from the steady-state relationships in the model. Finally,
the values of parameters mb and τb are chosen to target the time increase in the degree of
indebtedness of the economy.
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Figure 1: Cyclical components of output, wages and total hours.
Figure 2: Cyclical components of productivity, unemployment and total hours.
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Parameters from previous studies
Iacoviello (2005) provides values for the subjective intertemporal discount rate of patient
households, βl  0.99, the subjective discount rate of impatient households, βb  0.95, the
depreciation rate of physical capital, δ  0.03, and the adjustment cost for housing capital
φh  0.0. We take the Cobb-Douglas parameter α  0.7 from Campbell and Hercowitz
(2005 and 2009). With respect to labor market parameters, and following Andolfatto (1996)
and Cheron and Langot (2004), we set the exogenous transition rate from employment to
unemployment, σ  0.15, and the elasticity of matchings to vacant posts, χ2  0.6. From
these authors we also pick up some average steady-state values, as the probability of a
vacant position becoming a productive job, which is assumed to be ρ f  0.9, is consistent
with a vacancy being opened 45 days on average. The long-run employment ratio and
the fraction of time spent working are computed to be n  0.57 and l1  1/3, and the
fraction of time households spend searching is half the time spent working, l2  1/6. Also,
we assume that equilibrium unemployment is socially-efficient (see Hosios, 1990) and, as
such ψw  0.4 is equal to 1 χ2. For the intertemporal labor elasticity of substitution, η,
we rely on Andolfatto (1996) and consider η  2 implying that average individual labor
supply elasticity is equal to 1. The adjustment costs parameter, φ  5.95, is taken from
QUEST II (see Roeger and in’t Veld, 1997), which considers the same function as ours for
capital installation costs. The external habits parameters in consumption, hl  hb  0.7,
are between the low (0.36) and high (0.81) values estimated by Liu et al. (2009) and in
the upper bound of a 95 probability interval for impatient household habits estimated by
Iacoviello and Neri (2010).
Calibrated parameters from steady-state relationships
We normalize both steady-state output (y) and real housing prices (q) to one. From (38)
we obtain the long-run value for vacancies v  σn/ρ f . Then, we calibrate the ratio of
recruiting expenditures to output κvv/y to represent 0.5 percentage points of output, as
in Cheron and Langot (2004), to obtain a value of κv  0.053. In order to obtain A, we
first use (3) and (9) to ascertain the steady-state value of Tobin’s q (λ
l
2
λ
l
1
). Hence, we gain the
return on capital (r) using (8) and this allows us to compute the steady-state value for the
capital stock (k) from (34). Therefore the long-run value of total factor productivity, A 
1.801, is calibrated from the production function (30). The steady-state value of matching
flows in the economy equals the flow of jobs that are lost (σn) and we use the equality
(σn  χ1vχ2 1 n l2
1χ2 ) to solve for the scale parameter of the matching function,
χ1  1.007.
Using equation (37), we can solve for the steady-state value of wages (w). The
steady-state value of the nominal interest rate, rn, is related to the intertemporal discount
rate of lenders through equation (10). Let γl be the ratio of assets of patient households in
the steady state to total output (b
l  γly). From equation (24) we obtain b
b
conditional to
the value of γl . Next, we can compute the steady-state level of consumption of borrow-
ers, cb, from the budget restriction (14) and the consumption level of lenders, cl , from the
aggregation equation (22). Our next step consists of calibrating steady-state levels of the
marginal utilities of consumption of both types of consumers, λ
l
1 and λ
b
1, from their respec-
tive first-order conditions in equations (7) and (18). We can now obtain the steady-state
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holdings of housing of these types of agents, xb, from the borrowing restriction of impa-
tient households (equation (15)). The long-run equilibrium value for the multiplier of the
impatient household borrowing constraint, μb, can now be computed directly from the
first-order condition (19). This makes it possible to compute the parameter that accounts
for the housing weight in preferences, φx, from the last first-order condition of borrowers’
optimization program (equation (20)). The value of the parameter φx enables us to com-
pute the steady-state holdings of housing for lenders, xl , from the first order condition
(11), and the fixed stock of real estate in the economy, X, from the aggregation rule (25).
Notice that the value of φx and X is going to depend on the value we assign to the ratio of
assets of patient households in the steady state to total output, γl . In order to produce a
sensible calibration of this parameter and the steady-state level of the variables, we follow
Iacoviello (2005) and choose a value for γl , such that the total stock of housing over yearly
output is 140 per cent. The resulting value for φx is 0.097.
As regards preference parameters in the household utility function, φ1  2.221 is
calculated from the steady-state version of expression (41). A system of three equations
implying the steady state of expressions (12) (21) and (40) is solved for φ2, λ
b
h and λ
l
h. The
resulting value for φ2 is 1.420. Therefore, the calibrated values for φ1 and φ2 are similar
to those in Andolfatto (1996) and other related research in the literature. Such values im-
ply that the imputed value for leisure by an employed worker is situated well above the
imputed value for leisure by an unemployed worker.
Shocks and policy rule parameters
The parameters rR  0.73 and rπ  0.27 in the interest rate rule are taken from Iacoviello
(2005). For the parameter measuring interest rate reaction to output, ry, we choose a value
of 0. Regarding the productivity shock, we have chosen a high value for the autocorre-
lation parameter for technology shocks ρz  0.95 as in Campbell and Hercowitz (2005)
and Cheron and Langot (2004), whereas the standard deviation of the shock σz has been
calibrated so that the standard deviation of output matches its actual value in the 1964:1-
1982:4 subsample.
Table 2  Parameter Values
βl 0.99 η 2.00
βb 0.95 hl  hb 0.70
α 0.70 φ 5.95
δ 0.03 τb 0.36
κv 0.053 φh 0.00
σ 0.15 mb 0.775
χ1 1.007 φx 0.088
χ2 0.60 rR 0.73
ψw 0.40 rπ 0.27
l2 1/6 ry 0.0
φ1 2.22 φ2 1.42
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Loan to value ratios and share of borrowers
We use two adjusting parameters, the loan-to-value ratio and the share of borrowers, to
characterize the evolution of household leverage over time. In particular, we will allow
mb to change between 0.775 and 0.95. In the same vein, we will allow the fraction of
impatient consumers in the economy to vary between 0.36 and 0.56, which we conjecture
to be sensible bounds for the share of highly leveraged people in the US economy over the
period.
Our baseline calibration is mb  0.775 and τb  0.36 and we normalize steady state
output and housing prices to one. This calibration is assumed to represent a low indebt-
edness regime during the first period. Then, we relax the restrictions to obtain credit in
the economy either by allowing mb or τb to increase. The rest of parameters characteriz-
ing the different equations and shocks of the model are kept constant. Thus, all the results
discussed below are only conditional to the values for mb or τb.
A summary of the parameters of the model and the steady-state values of the en-
dogenous variables implied by the model solution for the baseline calibration are given in
Tables 2 and 3.
4. Simulation results
4.1 Borrowing restrictions
Our aim here is to show that mortgage market deregulation, and the consequent increase
in private leverage, may be behind the changes observed in the dynamic pattern of labor
market variables at the cycle frequency. With that purpose, we carry out a numerical ex-
ercise that shows how the model is able to qualitatively generate the kind of changes that
Table 3  Steady State
Search model with borrowing constraints and housing
ct 0.77 nt 0.57 bbt 2.15
clt 0.83 n
l
t 0.57 r
n
t 0.01
cbt 0.67 n
b
t 0.57 qt 1.00
jt 0.20 rt 0.04 xlt 7.19
jlt 0.32 vt 0.095 x
b
t 2.80
kt 6.78 wt 3.66 X 5.61
klt 10.59 yt 1.00
l1t 0.33 blt -1.21
the empirical second moments discussed above have undergone across the two samples.
First, we will use the initial impacts recovered from the impulse-response functions gen-
erated by the model, as a mean to illustrate the mechanism that causes our results, to offer
afterwards the predicted pattern in the variation of the second moments.
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Impact functions
In Figures 3 and 4 we depict the impact response to a one-percentage point transitory
increase in total factor productivity. We do it for a set of variables as a function of the
loan-to-value ratio (first column) and of the share of borrowers in the economy (second
column). These figures illustrate to what extent the variation in the degree of private
borrowing at both the extensive and intensive margins can affect the dynamics of the real
economy after a technology shock. To check the sensitivity of our results, we display the
plots in the first column for two values concerning the share of borrowers: τb  0.36 and
τb  0.56. In the same way, in the second column, we graph the results for two levels of
the loan-to-value ratio: mb  0.775 and mb  0.92510.
The marginal utility of consumption is a key variable that determines the outcome of
the bargaining process. Changes in the weighted average of (the inverse of) that variable,	
1τb
λl1t
 τb
λb1t


, can be thought of as shocks to the labor supply. Given that consumption
decisions and trade in the labor market are closely entwined in our model, we first focus
on Figure 3, concerning how consumption reacts to the shock. The reduction in equity re-
quirements for borrowers that we find as we move rightward along the loan-to-value axis
in the first column, relaxes the borrowing constraint, conditional to a positive shock. This
is reflected in the figure by the response of the Lagrange multiplier associated to the bor-
10 Coinciding with the ones set by Iacovello and Neri (2010) for the periods before and after the year 1982,
respectively.
rowing constraint, μbt . This response is negative and falls further as the loan-to-value ratio
increases. Therefore, after a positive technology shock, consumption of impatient house-
holds, cbt , increases by more the higher the loan-to-value ratio. The stronger increase in
borrower consumption drags down the marginal utility of consumption (λb1t), as depicted
in the figure.11 The increase in the demand for loans triggers a response from lenders who
find it optimal to channel resources from consumption and investment towards purchas-
ing private bonds. As a result, lenders’ consumption increases by less the lower the equity
requirements for borrowing are, moderating to some extent the reduction of their marginal
utility of consumption (λl1t). Importantly, the reaction to a positive technology shock of the
marginal utility of consumption of heavily leveraged and constrained consumers is much
stronger than that of lenders, as the shock not only increases their current income, but also
the value of their collateral (due to both the increase in the relative price of houses and the
fall in real interest rates) making their access to credit easier. This means that the response
of the weighted average of the inverse marginal utilities of consumption of both types of
households in the economy is dominated by the response of λb1t and increases with m
b.
The patterns for the initial impacts that we find on the right hand side of the Figure
3, corresponding to a variation in the share of borrowers, seem to indicate that while the
effect on lenders’ consumption tends to be reinforced by the number of borrowers, the
opposite is also true, albeit to a limited extent, for the case of borrowers. This fact is a
11 Habits at this step play a role. Habits in consumption, sure enough, act as an amplifier in the translation of
the impact of consumption to the marginal utility of consumption. This can be seen in a log-linearized version
(in deviations from the steady state) of the expression (18)
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Figure 3: Initial impacts to a technology shock: consumption decisions
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consequence of both a second-round effect driven by the behavior of labor income (see
explanation below), and also a scale effect that influences the per capita consumption of
both types of households.
The reaction of the labor market variables (Figure 4) can be better understood using
λb1t 
1
1 βhb1 hb

βhb

cbt1  hbcbt



cbt  hbcbt1
 
It is easy to recognize that as the degree of habits in consumption increases (as h tends to 1), the impact on λ1t
also increases for a given ct.
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Figure 4: Initial impacts to a technology shock: labor market
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the expression 40, for the negotiated wage, and the equation 41, for hours:
wtl1t  ψw

α
yt
nt1
 κvvt1 nt1

1 ψw

1 τb
λl1t
 τ
b
λb1t

φ2
1 l21η
1 η  φ1
1 l1t1η
1 η

1 ψw1 σ ρwt τbEt
λbht1
λb1t1

βl
λl1t1
λl1t
 βb λ
b
1t1
λb1t

α
φ1
yt
nt1l1,t
1 l1tη 

1 τb
λl1t
 τ
b
λb1t

After a positive technology shock,
	
1τb
λl1t
 τb
λb1t


increases with mb, which in turn pushes
the (optimally chosen) level of working hours down in equation (41)12, and increases both
the reservation wage and the real market wage in equation (40). A rise in the share of impa-
tient households, τb, strengthens this mechanism and, therefore, augmenting the number
of borrowers for a constant loan-to-value ratio provokes a similar reaction from the labor
market variables.
Finally, less hours and higher market wages act as a disincentive to post vacancies,
thus reducing matching activity in the labor market. As a result, the effect on employ-
ment scales down, along with that on capital and output, augmenting unemployment and
dampening the positive output effect of the shock itself. Because the impact on total hours
declines faster than that on output as the amount of leverage increases, the total impact on
labor productivity ytnt1l1,t increases.
Second moments
Having offered a picture of the initial impacts, we now turn our attention to the pattern
for second moments as a function of the level of private borrowing. Let us recall that the
standard deviation of the shock, σz, has been calibrated so that the standard deviation of
output in the model matches its actual value in the sample period prior to 1982:4. We will
assume that the autocorrelation and standard deviation of the shocks remain constant right
across the simulations. Thus, the empirical exercise we carry out below is conditional only
to the change in either the parameter mb capturing the loan-to-value ratio, or the number
of borrowers, τb.
12 Notice that this fall in hours worked following a technology shock is obtained without relying on price
stickiness as is common in the literature.
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Figure 5: Second moments as a function of private indebtedness: labor productivity, hours and wages
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In Figure 5 we represent the predictions the model makes for the correlation of la-
bor productivity with output and total hours, as well as the standard deviations (relative to
output) of total hours and wages. According to the stylized facts unveiled from the data,
these correlations have declined over time, whereas relative volatilities have increased.
These shifts appear clearly in the simulations in Figure 5, as a result of increasing private
borrowing in the economy, both at intensive margin (increase of the loan-to-value ratio)
and the extensive margin (increase in the number of borrowers). The explanation of the be-
havior concerning the relative standard deviations is quite straightforward looking at the
impact functions in the previous subsection. As borrowing increases, the positive impact
of a technology shock on wages increases and, at the same time, there is a more intense
decline in hours worked. Thus, the relative volatility of both wages and also total labor
input increases in a way that is consistent with the time pattern of these moments.
The intuition behind the two correlations is less straightforward. As impatient con-
sumers face less borrowing restrictions, lenders find it optimal to increase the amount of
loans by reducing their consumption and investment. As a consequence, productive in-
vestment and the capital stock become less volatile, lowering the standard deviation of
output. The different behavior of the labor input and capital, as indebtedness increases,
reduces the co-movement of hours with capital and makes labor productivity less corre-
lated with total hours and output.13
The model also explains the increase observed in the correlation between labor pro-
ductivity and unemployment and the fall in the correlation of productivity with vacancies
(Barnichon, 2009) (see Figure 6). Again, the explanation behind these results lies in the dif-
ferent behavior of unemployment and vacancies along the changes in the parameters we
are considering. While the technology shock generates a response of unemployment that
increases with the degree of leverage in the economy, the opposite is true for the case of
vacancies.
4.2 Labor market frictions
As said in the introduction, we do not interpret our results as opposite to those in Galí
and van Rens (2010) based on changes in labor market regulations. In fact our model
encompasses both explanations, since the introduction of financial frictions does not alter
the effect of relaxing labor market constraints. Our model replicates some of the results
concerning the second moments discussed above, as resulting from a steady reduction in
the cost of posting new vacancies. The range for this parameter in Figure 7 lies between a
13 When considering these correlations, it is useful to bear in mind the log-linearized version of the production
function we are using in our model yt  αnt  lt  1 αkt  εt which can be directly transformed into labor
productivity as yt  nt  lt  α 1nt  lt  1 αkt  t.
0 and a 3 per cent of output, with the low bound 0 being close to the frictionless scenario in
the labor market. As in Galí and van Rens (2010), we take the labor input to be represented
only by employment and, therefore, we change the definition of labor productivity. As the
results in Figure 7 show, the expected decrease in the correlations between productivity
and output and productivity and employment are captured to some extent by a reduction
in this friction. Interestingly, this exercise also captures the increase in correlation between
productivity and unemployment and the increasing relative deviation of employment.
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labor productivity,
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The interpretation of the mechanism is akin to Galí and van Rens (2010) and it falls
on the demand side of the labor market. When labor market frictions are high, firms
adjust the intensive margin (in our case, hours per worker) to a positive technology shock.
The reduction in labor market frictions allows firms to adjust the extensive margin more
easily, thus increasing the relative volatility of employment. When we relax the borrowing
constraints in our model, this substitution between the intensive and the extensive margin
is of sufficient magnitude, providing borrower indebtedness is high enough, as to trigger
a significant response from the intensive margin (hours per worker) to the shock.
Another way to understand how the models work is to compare with the basic dy-
namics of the RBC model. In a standard RBC model, labor demand increases along an up-
ward sloping labor supply curve in response to a positive productivity shock. The rise in
consumption shifts the labor supply curve to the left, but, given consumption smoothing
motives, the rise in labor demand dominates, so that hours and wages rise. The introduc-
tion of search frictions makes wages less sensitive to shifts in technology, thus enhancing
the response of total hours, which rise more than in the standard RBC model. The pres-
ence of households’ financial frictions creates a larger inward shift in the labor supply
curve instead, as a consequence of the increase of borrowers’ consumption. Hence, easier
access to credit weakens the response of hours to a productivity shock, something that is
qualitatively similar to the effect of a reduction of search frictions.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 34 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1129
0 0.1 0.2 0.3
0.965
0.97
0.975
0.98
C
or
r(y
/n
,y
)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3
0.92
0.94
0.96
0 0.1 0.2 0.3
0
0.2
0.4
C
or
r(y
/n
,n
)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 0.1 0.2 0.3
-0.4
-0.2
0
C
or
r(y
/n
,u
)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
0 0.1 0.2 0.3
0.95
1
1.05
R
el
Sd
(w
)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3
0.95
1
1.05
0 0.1 0.2 0.3
0.22
0.24
0.26
R
el
Sd
(n
)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
Low share
High share
Low m
High m
Labor market frictions Labor market frictions
Figure 7: Simulated second moments for variations in labor market frictions: labor input is employment.
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costs. The labor demand channel is the key in this explanation: labor market deregula-
tion cheapens the adjustment through the extensive margin (employment), the volatility
of which increases, while that of the intensive margin (effort in Galí and van Rens, 2010,
and hours per worker in our paper) falls.
In this paper we show that these and other labor market facts can be also thought of
as the outcome of the continuous process of financial deepening, as represented by the in-
crease in household indebtedness that has occurred since the early eighties. To that end we
set up a DSGE model with flexible prices, in which the presence of financially constrained
consumers is intertwined with the process of vacancy creation, to deliver a powerful trans-
mission mechanism of technology shocks. Leveraging in our model is parameterized as an
increase in the loan-to-value ratio for constrained borrowers, or as an increase in the num-
ber of borrowers in the economy. The way financial factors affect labor market outcomes
is a bit more cumbersome, since it primarily entails not a labor demand but rather a la-
bor supply effect, in which both the extensive and intensive margins respond in the same
way. When borrowers have easier access to credit, their consumption reacts more strongly
and so their relative bargaining power vis-a-vis the firm increases. Thus, higher access to
credit reduces working hours and increases wages, which in turn discourages firms from
posting vacancies. This heightened response of total labor input to the technology shock is
the pivotal element in explaining the observed time pattern in volatilities and correlations
in the data.
5. Conclusions
The dynamics of business cycle fluctuations have undergone a substantial transformation
over the last two decades. The labor market has not been exempt from these changes;
in fact, recent empirical research has uncovered a clear pattern as regards the evolution
of volatilities and cross correlations of the most important labor market variables, such
as employment, wages, labor productivity, unemployment and vacancies. The most nat-
ural explanation of this evidence can be found in the profound impact that labor market
deregulation, since the early eighties, may have had on the dynamics of these variables.
This is indeed what Galí and van Rens (2010) achieve on the basis of a reduction in hiring
costs and which we replicate in this paper as a consequence of a fall in vacancy posting
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Appendix 1: Data Sources
Table A1 - Data
Variable Data Source
Total Hours Nonfarm Business Sector: Hours of All Persons FRED
Labor productivity Nonfarm Business Sector: Output Per Hour of All Persons FRED
Wages Nonfarm Business Sector: Real Compensation Per Hour FRED
Vacancies Help wanted index Conference Board
Unemployment rate Monthly Civilian Unemployment Rate BLS
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